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We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation models and subject the 
models to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different 
predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not 
to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a 
laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information 
conditions. We find that the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between 
treatments well. The data also provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in 
terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather 
individuals’ propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences. 
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Everyone who watches children growing up will attest that imitation is a
main source of learning. And introspection shows that imitation plays a
large role also for the learning behavior of adults, in particular when faced
with unfamiliar environments. While social scientists and psychologists have
long recognized the importance of imitation (see Ash, 1952, for an early
example), imitation has only recently moved into the focus of economists.
Important theoretical advances have been made by Vega—Redondo (1997)
and Schlag (1998 and 1999). Both approaches are based on the idea that in-
dividuals who face repeated choice problems will imitate others who obtained
high payoﬀs in previous rounds. But despite this basic similarity, the two
theories imply markedly diﬀerent predictions when applied to speciﬁc games.
For example, for games with a Cournot structure, Schlag’s model predicts
Cournot—Nash equilibrium play,1 while Vega—Redondo’s model predicts the
Walrasian outcome.2 The latter prediction is also obtained by Selten and
Ostmann’s (2001) notion of an ‘imitation equilibrium’.
The current paper makes two main contributions. First, we introduce a
generalized theoretical approach to imitation, which enables us to analyze
why the models of Vega—Redondo (1997) and Schlag (1998, 1999) come to
such diﬀerent predictions. We show that the diﬀerence between the two
models is due to diﬀerent informational assumptions rather than diﬀerent
learning or adjustment rules. It is more important whom one imitates than
how one imitates. In particular, if one imitates one’s own opponents, out-
comes become very competitive. If, on the other hand, one imitates other
players who face the same problem as oneself but play against diﬀerent op-
ponents, then Nash equilibrium play is obtained.
The second objective of our paper is to present rigorous experimental
tests of the diﬀerent imitation models. We chose to study imitation in a
1Cournot—Nash is also predicted by imitation models in large population settings as
studied by Bj¨ ornerstedt and Weibull (1996).
2Variants of Vega—Redondo’s model in which players have more than one period mem-
ory produce diﬀerent results as shown by Alos—Ferrer (2001) and Bergin and Bernhardt
(2001).
1normal form game with the payoﬀ structure of a simple discrete Cournot
game. This has the advantage that the theoretical predictions of the various
imitation models are very distinct. Both traditional benchmark outcomes
of oligopoly models (Cournot—Nash equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium)
are supported by at least one imitation model. Also, the games are easy
to implement in an experiment, and we have a good understanding of how
Cournot markets operate in laboratory environments under diﬀerent circum-
stances.3
Despite being inherently “behavioral”, there have been few experiments
of imitation models. In particular, Schlag’s imitation model has not been
experimentally tested at all, while the models of Vega—Redondo and Selten
and Ostmann have been subject to isolated experiments. Huck, Normann,
and Oechssler (1999, 2000) and Oﬀerman, Potters, and Sonnemans (2002)
experimentally support Vega-Redondo’s model. Also, Abbink and Brandts
(2002) provide data that are well-organized by a model closely related to
Vega-Redondo’s. Finally, Selten and Apesteguia (2002) ﬁnd some experi-
mental support for Selten and Ostmann’s (2001) static model of imitation.
The experimental design of the current paper has the advantage that it
allows to test all the above mentioned theories in one uniﬁed frame. Subjects
interact in groups. In one treatment (called GROUP) they can only observe
the performance of their opponents with whom they play in the same group.
In a second treatment (ROLE), they can only observe the performance of
subjects who are in the same role but play in a diﬀerent group. Finally,
there is a ‘FULL information’ treatment in which subjects can observe all
of the above.
In our data, all qualitative predictions of the generalized imitation model
are conﬁrmed, both, at the aggregate and the individual level. Speciﬁcally,
average outputs are ranked according to the theoretical predictions and sig-
niﬁcantly so. In particular, in line with Vega—Redondo, the treatment in
which opponents can be observed is the most competitive. The treatment
in which only subjects in other groups can be observed is roughly in line
3See e.g. Plott (1989), Holt (1995), and Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2003) for
surveys.
2with the Cournot—Nash equilibrium prediction and is the least competitive.
Intermediate outcomes result if subjects have access to both types of infor-
mation.
On the individual level we ﬁnd that, much in line with Schlag’s model,
the likelihood of imitation increases in the diﬀerence between the highest
payoﬀ o b s e r v e da n dt h eo w np a y o ﬀ. Imitation is not unconditional. More-
over, we ﬁnd that imitation is more pronounced when subjects observe others
with whom they directly compete–rather than others who have the same
role but play in diﬀerent groups. The reason for this is still an open question.
All these results are obtained from studying choice data. Subjects do
imitate and they do it in speciﬁc ways. Whether or not subjects are aware of
this, is a diﬀerent issue on which we shed some light by analyzing replies to
a post—experimental questionnaire. Interestingly, many replies quite clearly
reveal that subjects know what they are doing. Many also perceive them-
selves as imitating.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the games and the experimental details. In Section 3 we review the imita-
tion models, introduce a general framework, and derive theoretical results.
In Section 4 the experimental results are reported and, ﬁnally, Section 5
concludes. Most proofs are collected in Appendix A. The instructions for
the experiment are shown in Appendix B.
2 Experimental design and procedures
In our experiments subjects repeatedly play simple 3—player normal form
games, with a payoﬀ structure that is derived from a symmetric Cournot
game. All players have ﬁve pure strategies with identical labels, a,b,c,d,
and e. Subjects are, however, not told anything about the game’s payoﬀ
function apart from the fact that their payoﬀ deterministically depends on
their own choice and the choices of two others, and that the payoﬀ function
is the same throughout all the experime n t( s e et h et r a n s l a t e di n s t r u c t i o n s
in Appendix B).
Interaction in the experiment takes place in populations of nine sub-
3jects. Each subject has a role and belongs to a group. There are three roles,
labelled X,Y, and Z, ﬁlled by three subjects each. Roles are allocated ran-
domly at the beginning of the experiment and then kept ﬁxed for the entire
session. Sessions last for 60 periods. In each period, subjects are randomly
matched into three groups, such that always one X—player is matched with
one of the Y —players and one of the Z—players.4 While subjects know that
they are randomly matched each period, they are not told with whom they
are matched and there are no subject-speciﬁc labels. In each experimental
session, two independent populations of nine subjects participate to increase
anonymity. After each period, subjects learn their own payoﬀ. Additional
feedback information depends on the treatment.
There are three treatments altogether. It is convenient to introduce some
notation before describing them. Let player (i,j)t be the player who has role
i ∈ {X,Y,Z} in group j ∈ {1,2,3} at time t,a n dl e ts
j
i(t)b et h a tp l a y e r ’ s
strategy and π
j
i(t)h i sp a y o ﬀ in t.
Treatment ROLE In treatment ROLE player (i,j)t can observe, after




i(t) for all j. That is, a player is informed of
the actions and payoﬀs of players who have the same role as himself
but play in diﬀerent groups.
Treatment GROUP In treatment GROUP player (i,j)t can observe, af-




i(t) for all i. That is, a player is informed
of the actions and payoﬀs of players in his own group.
Treatment FULL In treatment FULL player (i,j)t can observe all the
information given in treatments ROLE and GROUP.56
4One might wonder why we introduce roles to study behavior in a symmetric game.
The answer is twofold. First, this allows us to disentangle the eﬀects of imitation rules and
information. Second, we will be able to use the identical setup for studying asymmetric
games in follow-up projects.
5Notice that “FULL” does not imply that players observe everything that happened in
the last period. In particular, player (i,j)t cannot observe the choice and payoﬀ of player
(h,k)t when h 6= i and k 6= j.









i(t). The reason for this is that we plan to study in future
work theories based on aspiration levels for which we would like to use FULL as a base
treatment.
4Table 1: Payoﬀ table
action combination of other players in group
aa ab ac ad ae bb bc bd be cc cd ce dd de ee
a 1200 1140 1000 880 800 1080 940 820 740 800 680 600 560 480 400
b 1311 1242 1081 943 851 1173 1012 874 782 851 713 621 575 483 391
c 1500 1410 1200 1020 900 1320 1110 930 810 900 720 600 540 420 300
d 1584 1476 1224 1008 864 1368 1116 900 756 864 648 504 432 288 144
e 1600 1480 1200 960 800 1360 1080 840 680 800 560 400 320 160 0
Note: The order in which the actions of the other group members is displayed does
not matter.
The payoﬀ function is based on a linear Cournot market with inverse
demand, p = 120 − X, and zero costs. The strategies a,b,c,d, and e cor-
respond to the output quantities 20, 23, 30, 36, and 40, respectively. That
is, a corresponds to the symmetric joint proﬁt maximizing output, c to the
Cournot output, and e to the symmetric Walrasian output. The payoﬀ ta-
ble (unknown to subjects) is displayed in Table 1. Subjects are told that
the experimental payoﬀs are converted to Euros using an exchange rate of
3000:1.7
The computerized experiments8 were carried out in June 2002 in the
Laboratory for Experimental Research in Economics in Bonn. Subjects
were recruited via posters on campus. For each treatment we carried out
three sessions – each with two independent populations of nine subjects,
which gives us six independent observations per treatment. Accordingly, the
total number of subjects was 162 (= 9 × 6 × 3). The experiments lasted on
average 70 minutes, and average payments were 15.25 Euros.9
After the 60 rounds subjects were presented with a questionnaire in
which they were asked for their major ﬁeld of study and for the motivation
of their decisions.
7In the ﬁrst session of treatment FULL we used an exchange rate of 4000:1.
8The program was written with z—tree of Fischbacher (1999).
9A tt h et i m eo ft h ee x p e r i m e n to n eE u r ow a sw o r t ha b o u to n eU Sd o l l a r .
53 Imitation theories
In this section we will establish theoretical predictions for various imitation
models in the context of our experimental design. Recall that the treatments
vary with respect to the information subjects receive about actions and/or
payoﬀs in the previous round. We refer to the set of individuals whose
actions and payoﬀs can be observed by individual (i,j)t, as (i,j)t’s reference
group, R(i,j)t. Individual (i,j)t’s set of observed actions includes all actions
played by someone in his reference group and is denoted by
O(i,j)t := {sk
h(t)|(h,k)t ∈ R(i,j)t}.
Notice that (i,j)t ∈ R(i,j)t and s
j
i(t) ∈ O(i,j)t in all our experimental
treatments.
Following Schlag (1999) we call a behavioral rule imitating if it prescribes
for each individual to choose an observed action from the previous round.
A noisy imitating rule is a rule that is imitating with probability 1 − ε and
allows for mistakes with probability ε > 0. (In case of a mistake any other
action is chosen with positive probability.) A behavioral rule with inertia
allows an individual to change his action only with probability π ∈ (0,1) in
each round. In the following we shall ﬁrst characterize diﬀerent imitation
rules according to their properties without noise or inertia. Predictions for
the Cournot game will then be derived by adding noise and inertia.
A popular and plausible rule is “imitate the best” (see e.g. Vega—
Redondo, 1997) which simply prescribes to choose the strategy that in the
previous period performed best among the observed actions. In our setting
it is possible that an action yields diﬀerent payoﬀsi nd i ﬀerent groups. This
implies that it is a priori not clear how an agent should evaluate the ac-
tions he observes. An evaluation rule assigns a value to each action in a
player’s set of observed actions O(i,j)t. When an action yields the same
payoﬀ everywhere in his reference group, there is no ambiguity and the ac-
tion is evaluated with this observed payoﬀ.10 When diﬀerent payoﬀs occur
for the same action, various rules might be applied. Below we will focus on
10T h i si sa l w a y st h ec a s ei nt r e a t m e n tG R O U P .
6two evaluation rules that appear particularly natural in a simple imitation
setting with boundedly rational agents: the max rule where each strategy
is evaluated according to the highest payoﬀ it received, and the average rule
where each strategy is evaluated according to the average payoﬀ observed
in the reference group. Of course, other rules, such as a “pessimistic” min
rule, might also have some good justiﬁcation. Nevertheless, we shall follow
the previous literature and focus on the max and the average rules.11
Deﬁnition 1 An imitating rule is called “imitate the best” if it satisﬁes the
property that (without noise and inertia) an agent switches to a new action
if and only if this action has been played by an agent in his reference group
in the previous round, and was evaluated as at least as good as that of any
other action played in his reference group. When several actions satisfy this,
any of those is chosen with positive probability.
• “Imitate the best” combined with the average rule is called “imitate the
best average” (IBA).
• “Imitate the best” combined with the max rule is called “imitate the
best max” (IBM).
Schlag (1998) shows in the context of a decision problem in which agents
can observe one other participant that “imitate the best” and many other
plausible rules do not satisfy certain optimality conditions. Instead, Schlag
(1998) advocates the “Proportional Imitation Rule” which prescribes to im-
itate an action with a probability proportional to the (positive part of the)
payoﬀ diﬀerence between that action’s payoﬀ from last period and the own
payoﬀ from last period. If the observed action yielded a lower payoﬀ,i ti s
never imitated.
The extension of this analysis to the case of agents observing two or
more actions is not straightforward. Schlag (1999) considers the case of two
observations and singles out two rules that are both “optimal” according
to a number of plausible criteria, the “double imitation” rule (DI) and the
11For “imitate the best average”, see, e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and Schlag
(1999). For “imitate the best max”, see Selten and Ostmann (2001).
7“sequential proportional observation” rule (SPOR). In both cases, Schlag
assumes that strategies are evaluated with the average rule. Specifying the
two rules in more detail is beyond the scope of this study since our data do
not allow to check more than some general properties of classes of rules to
which DI and SPOR belong.
Schlag (1999, Remark 2) shows that with two observations both, DI and
SPOR, satisfy the following properties:
(i) They are imitating rules.
(ii) The probability of imitating another action increases with that action’s
previous payoﬀ and decreases with the payoﬀ the (potential) imitator
achieved himself.
(iii) If all actions in O(i,j)t are distinct, the more successful actions are
imitated with higher probability.
Furthermore, it can be shown that DI satisﬁes the following plausible
properties.
(iv) N e v e rs w i t c ht oa na c t i o nw i t ha na v e r a g ep a y o ﬀ lower than the average
payoﬀ of the own action.
(v) Imitate the action with the highest average payoﬀ in the sample with
strictly positive probability (unless one already plays an action with
the best average payoﬀ).
(vi) N e v e rs w i t c ht oa na c t i o nw i t ha v e r a g ep a y o ﬀ below the average payoﬀ
in the sample.
Property (iv) shows that DI belongs to the large class of imitating rules
that use the average evaluation rule and can be described as “imitate only
if better”. Combined with property (v) “imitate the best with positive
probability” this is all we need for deriving the theoretical properties of DI
and similar rules in the context of our experiment.
8Deﬁnition 2 An imitating rule is called a “weakly imitate the best average”
rule (WIBA) if it satisﬁes (without noise and inertia) properties (iv) and
(v).
If we modify Properties (iv) and (v) to allow for the max rule, we obtain
(iv0) N e v e rs w i t c ht oa na c t i o nw i t ham a x i m a lp a y o ﬀ lower than the max-
imal payoﬀ of the own action.
(v0) Imitate the action with the highest maximal payoﬀ in the sample with
strictly positive probability (unless one already plays an action with
the highest maximal payoﬀ).
Deﬁnition 3 An imitating rule is called a “weakly imitate the best max”
rule (WIBM) if it satisﬁes (without noise and inertia) properties (iv’) and
(v’).
While IBA (“imitate the best average”) as well as DI (double imitation)
belong to the class of WIBA (“weakly imitate the best average”) rules, IBM
belongs to WIBM. The rule SPOR does not belong to either class of rules
since it violates (iv) and (iv’).
Before we proceed with deriving theoretical predictions, we need to in-
troduce some further notation. The imitation dynamics induce a Markov
chain on a ﬁnite state space Ω.As t a t eω ∈ Ω is characterized by three strat-










3)). Notice that there is no need to refer to speciﬁc individuals in
the deﬁnition of a state, i.e., here s
j
i (without the time index) refers to the
strategy used by whoever has role i and happens to be in group j.




i,j,h,k and denote a uniform state by ωs, s ∈ {a,b,c,d,e}. Two uniform
states will be of particular interest. The state in which everybody plays the
Cournot Nash strategy c, to which we will refer as the Cournot state ωc;
and the state in which everybody plays the Walrasian strategy e,t ow h i c h
we shall refer as the Walrasian state ωe.
9To analyze the properties of the Markov processes induced by the various
imitation rules discussed above, we shall now add (vanishing) noise and
inertia. That is, whenever we refer in the following to some rule as, for
example “imitate the best”, we shall imply that agents are subject to, both,
inertia and (vanishing) noise. States that are in the support of the limit
invariant distribution of the process (for ε → 0) are called stochastically
stable. The (graph theoretic) methods for analyzing stochastic stability
(pioneered in economics by Canning, 1992, Kandori, Mailath, and Rob,
1993, and Young, 1993) are, by now, standard (see e.g. Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998, and Young, 1998, for text book treatments).
In the following we will state a number of propositions that show how
the long-run predictions of the imitation rules we consider depend on the
underlying informational structures. We begin by stating results for WIBA
and WIBM. It will turn out that WIBA and WIBM rules lead to identi-
cal predictions if agents either observe other agents in their group or other
agents in the same role. They diﬀer if agents can observe both as in treat-
ment FULL. Finally, we will analyze SPOR rules and show that they yield
the same long-run predictions regardless of the treatment.
Our ﬁrst proposition concerns WIBA and WIBM rules in treatment
GROUP.
Proposition 1 If agents follow either a WIBA (“weakly imitate the best
average”) or a WIBM (“weakly imitate the best max”) rule and if the refer-
ence group is as in treatment GROUP, the Walrasian state ωe is the unique
stochastically stable state.
Proof see Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is similar to the intuition in Vega-Redondo’s
original treatment of the imitate the best rule. In any given group, the
agent with the highest output obtains the highest proﬁta sl o n ga sp r i c e s
are positive. This induces a push toward more competitive outcomes.12
12Introducing constant positive marginal cost does not change the result. If price is
below marginal cost, the agent with the lowest output is imitated which again pushes the
process towards the Walrasian state.
10Let us now turn to treatment ROLE where (h,k)t ∈ R(i,j)t if and
only if h = i. We will see that the change of the informational structure
has dramatic consequences. If agents can only observe others who are in
the same role as they themselves but play in diﬀerent groups, the unique
stochastically stable outcome under a WIBA rule and a WIBM rule is the
Cournot—Nash equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 2 If agents follow a WIBA or a WIBM rule and if the ref-
erence group is as in treatment ROLE, the Cournot state ωc is the unique
stochastically stable state.
Proof see Appendix A.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is that any deviation from the Cournot
Nash equilibrium play lowers the deviator’s absolute payoﬀ.A g e n t si nt h e
same role will observe this but will not imitate because they earn more using
the equilibrium strategy. On the other hand, one can construct sequences of
one-shot mutations that lead into the Cournot state from any other state.
Turning to treatment FULL one might expect that its richer informa-
tional structure (where agents have the combined information of treatments
GROUP and ROLE) causes some tension between the Walrasian and the
Cournot outcome. It turns out that this intuition is correct. In fact, with
a WIBA rule there are two stochastically stable states in treatment FULL,
t h eC o u r n o ts t a t e( w h e r ee v e r y b o d yp l a y sc), and the state where everybody
plays d.
Proposition 3 If agents follow a WIBA rule and if the reference group is
as in treatment FULL, then both, the Cournot state ωc and the state in
which everyone takes action d, ωd, are the stochastically stable states.
Proof see Appendix A.
Comparing a WIBA rule with a WIBM rule, one might say that agents
following WIBM are “more aggressive”. Hence, one might intuitively expect
that WIBM leads to higher quantities than WIBA. As the next proposition
11shows this is true in the sense that, in addition to ωc and ωd,t h eW a l r a s i a n
state, ωe, is stochastically stable under WIBM.
Proposition 4 If agents follow a WIBM rule and if the reference group is
as in treatment FULL, then the Cournot state ωc, the state in which everyone
takes action d, ωd, and the Walrasian state ωe are the stochastically stable
states.
Proof see Appendix A.
In contrast to the previous studied rules, the SPOR rule of Schlag (1999)
also allows to imitate actions that do worse than the current action one
is using. This has the consequence that, in the framework of stochastic
stability, any uniform state can be a long run outcome of the process.
Proposition 5 If agents follow a SPOR rule, all uniform states are stochas-
tically stable regardless of their reference group.
Proof Agents following SPOR imitate any strategy with positive proba-
bility except an action that yields 0, the absolutely worst payoﬀ (see
Schlag, 1999). Thus, we observe a) that only uniform states are ab-
sorbing and b) that it is possible to move from any uniform state to
any other uniform state by just one mutation, which implies that all
uniform states are stochastically stable.¥
3.1 Imitation Equilibrium
We shall now review the recently introduced notion of an imitation equilib-
rium (IE) (Selten and Ostmann, 2001), and derive its predictions for our
treatments. Unlike the preceding models, imitation equilibrium is a static
equilibrium notion. Following Selten and Ostmann (2001) we will say that





such that the payoﬀso fp l a y e r( h,k)a r et h eh i g h e s ti nR(i,j) and there is
no player in R(i,j)p l a y i n gs
j
i with payoﬀsa sh i g ha s( h,k).13 A destination
13This requirement is the same as in IBM.
12is a state without imitation opportunities. An imitation path is a sequence
of states where the transition from one element of the sequence to the next
is deﬁned by all players with imitation opportunities taking one of them.
The imitation path continues as long as there are imitation opportunities.
An imitation equilibrium is a destination that satisﬁes that all imitation
paths generated by any deviation of any one player return to the original
state. Two classes of imitation paths generated by a deviation (henceforth
called deviation paths) that return to the original state are distinguished.
(i) Deviation paths with deviator involvement: the deviator himself takes
an imitation opportunity at least once and the deviation path returns to the
original state.
(ii) Deviation paths without deviator involvement: the destination reached
by a deviation path where the deviator never had an imitation opportunity
gives lower payoﬀs to the deviator than those at the original state, making
that the deviator returns to the original strategy. This creates an imitation
path that returns to the original state.
Proposition 6 Imitation equilibrium (IE) is characterized by the following.
(a) In Treatment GROUP the Walrasian state ωe is the unique IE.
(b) In Treatment ROLE the Cournot state ωc i st h eu n i q u eI E .
(c) In Treatment FULL ωc, ωd,a n dωe are the only uniform IE.
Proof see Appendix A.
The proposition reveals remarkable similarities between Selten and Ost-
mann’s imitation equilibrium and the dynamic class of WIBM rules. In
fact, imitation equilibrium and the long-run predictions of WIBM coincide
perfectly for the current game.
3.2 Some qualitative hypotheses and simulations
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical results and indicates for each behavioral
rule considered above whether two easy-to-check properties are satisﬁed with
respect to the evaluation rule used.
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IBM X —a s W I B M
SPOR — — ωa,ωb,ωc,ωd,ωe
IE X —a s W I B M
Note: A “X” indicates that the theory in question satisﬁes the property given the
rule to evaluate payoﬀs. “−” indicates that the theory does not in general satisfy
this property. ∗ this prediction is without noise. ∗∗In all cases except IE this is the
set of stochastically stable outcomes.
All imitation rules, with the exception of SPOR, have in common that
they predict that agents should not switch to strategies that are evaluated
as worse than the strategy they currently employ. Moreover, it can be
shown that DI and IBA additionally satisfy the property that no strategy is
imitated that (on average) yielded a payoﬀ below the population average.
With respect to outputs, all imitation rules, except SPOR, suggest that
outputs in treatment GROUP (where Walrasian levels are expected in the
long run) should be rather high, whereas in treatment ROLE a lower output
level, the Cournot outcome, is expected. Since treatment FULL provides
both kind of information, one might expect an intermediate outcome be-
tween GROUP and ROLE. This suggests the following qualitative hypoth-
esis about the ordering of output levels:
QH :R O L E¹ FULL ¹ GROUP.
In order to address justiﬁed concerns that stochastic stability analysis
may fail to yield reasonable predictions for an experiment with only 60
14rounds, we run simulations for the diﬀerent treatments. In particular, we
simulate a population of 9 players over 60 rounds when each player behaves
according to the IBM rule (IBA yields almost identical results) given the ref-
erence group deﬁned by the respective treatment. Since stochastic stability
analysis is often criticized for the assumption of vanishing noise, we include
in the simulation a substantial amount of noise. With probability 0.8 in
each round a player follows IBM. With probability 0.2 a player chooses ran-
domly one of the ﬁve actions with equal probability. For each treatment we
simulated 100 such populations with starting actions chosen from a uniform
distribution.
Figure 1 shows the average frequencies with which actions were chosen in
each round. The Walrasian prediction (ωe) for treatment GROUP is clearly
conﬁrmed by the simulations. Apart from action e, all other actions survive
only due to the relatively high noise level. Convergence takes only about
10 periods. Likewise, in treatment FULL the prediction of IBM is fully
conﬁrmed, only ωe, ωd, and ωc are played more often than the noise level
requires. In treatment ROLE, the predicted action c is also the modal and
median choice in the simulations. However, convergence is relatively slow.
The reason seems to be the following. In treatment ROLE the number of
absorbing states (of the unperturbed imitation process) is higher than in the
other treatments because besides uniform states, all states in which players
in a given role play the same action are absorbing (see the proof of Propo-
sition 2). A detailed look at the simulations reveals that indeed the process
often gets stuck in such states which of course slows down convergence.
Over all 60 periods, average outputs in the simulations were 30.3 for
ROLE, 33.63 for FULL, and 37.7 for GROUP, which conﬁrms the ordering
in hypothesis QH.14 In the following sections, we shall test this hypothesis
against the aggregate results from the experiments.

























































Figure 1: Time series of the simulated average frequencies of output levels
per treatment.
164 Experimental results
We now turn to the experimental analysis of the generalized imitation frame-
work proposed above. We organize this section as follows. First, based on
the qualitative hypotheses QH derived above, we evaluate the data on the
aggregate level. This will give a ﬁrst idea of whether and how imitation
shapes subjects’ behavior. We then turn our attention to the study of in-
dividual behavior. In Section 4.2.1 all imitation rules are evaluated with
respect to what they say about when not to imitate while in Sections 4.2.2
we analyze the issues of when and how to imitate. To evaluate rules that
make explicit statements about the probability of imitating a certain ac-
tion (like those of Schlag, 1998, 1999), we study in Section 4.3 a probit
model. Finally, we conclude this section by analyzing the post-experimental
questionnaires. This will provide additional insight whether subjects are
intentional imitators or whether it just looks as if they are.
4.1 Aggregate behavior
We begin by considering some summary statistics on the aggregate level.
Table 3 shows average outputs for all treatments, separately for the entire
sixty rounds of the experiment and the last thirty. Standard deviations of
the six observations per treatment are shown in parenthesis. The average
of individual variances over all 60 and the last 30 periods are also given in
Table 3.
Figure 2 shows average outputs per treatment in an average block time
series, organized in blocks of ten periods.
Both, Table 3 and Figure 2, clearly show that output levels are ordered
as predicted. In particular, outputs in ROLE are lower than in FULL, and
i nF U L Ll o w e rt h a ni nG R O U P .T h ep—values for (two—sided) permuta-
tion tests (see, e.g., Siegel and Castellan, 1988) on the basis of the average
outputs per population are as follows:
ROLE ≺.008 FULL ≺.02 GROUP

















avg. var.1−60 49.78 51.31 54.43
avg. var.31−60 43.00 49.07 53.02
Note: avg. outputs are calculated by using the output levels 20, 23, 30, 36, and 40.
Standard deviations of avg. output of the 6 independent observations per treatment
are given in parenthesis. avg.varτ−t is the average over individual variances in




























Figure 2: Block time series of average outputs per treatment.
18This is exactly in line with the qualitative predictions derived in the pre-
vious section. We see that the type of feedback information available to
subjects has a statistically signiﬁcant impact on behavior – lending strong
qualitative support to the generalized imitation model and stressing the im-
portance of informational conditions. The diﬀerences in average quantities
are less pronounced than predicted by theory though, which indicates that
other factors besides imitation play a role too.
Also, Table 3 and Figure 2 indicate that there is an increasing trend in
output. The Spearman rank order correlation coeﬃcients between the time
series of the average output levels and time are positive in all treatments,
and signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (two-sided) in GROUP (rs =0 .49) and
FULL (rs =0 .62), but not signiﬁcant in ROLE (rs =0 .23).
For now, we summarize our main ﬁnding in
Result 1 Outputs are ordered as predicted by hypothesis QH and signiﬁcantly
so.
Given the usual noise in experimental data from human subjects, Result
1 seems quite remarkable. However, before drawing more deﬁnite conclu-
sions about the viability of imitation it is necessary to analyze individual
adjustments which we shall do in the following section.
4.2 Individual Behavior
A proper experimental test of imitation theories needs to consider individual
data. Thus, in this section we evaluate the success of the imitation models
by computing compliance rates of individual adjustment behavior with the
predictions of the respective models. We do this in two ways. We begin by
considering negative predictions, i.e. predictions about when not to imitate.
In Subsection 4.2.2 we then consider positive predictions for IBA and IBM,
i.e., predictions about when to imitate.
4.2.1 When not to imitate
The predictions of all imitation rules with regard to when not to imitate
are summarized in Table 2. WIBA, WIBM, and IE predict that one should
19Table 4: Compliance with qualitative predictions
Never Imitate Worse than...
Own Average
G R O U PR O L EF U L LG R O U PR O L EF U L L
WIBA, DI 90.2% 83.9% 83.6% — — —
WIBM, IE 90.2% 84.5% 83.8% — — —
DI, IBA — — — 94.3% 91.6% 86.4%
not imitate an action with payoﬀs evaluated as lower than those of the
own action. We refer to this prediction as “never imitate worse than own”.
WIBA rules predict not to imitate an action that on average gave lower
payoﬀs than the average payoﬀs of the own action. Similarly, WIBM rules
and IE predict not to imitate an action whose maximum payoﬀsa r el o w e r
than the maximum payoﬀs of the own action.
Furthermore, DI and IBA also predict not to imitate an action whose
average payoﬀs are below the average payoﬀs in the sample. This implies
that in treatment GROUP (ROLE) players should not imitate an action
with average payoﬀs below the average payoﬀs who are in the same group
(have the same role), while in treatment FULL players should not imitate an
action with payoﬀs below the average payoﬀs of the set of all nine players.15
We refer to this prediction as “never imitate worse than average”.
Table 4 summarizes the average rates of compliance with respect to
“never imitate worse than own” and “never imitate worse than average”
for each of the relevant treatments. The compliance rates are rather high
in all cases but particularly high for treatment GROUP. Note also that the
compliance rates for “never imitate worse than average” are even higher
than those for “never imitate worse than own”, which gives some support
for DI and IBA.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of participants on the basis of their com-
pliance rates with the predictions of when not to imitate. As can be seen,
the large majority of subjects show compliance rates higher than 80%. In
fact, more than 30% of subjects show rates of compliance of 90% or higher.
15Recall that this information was provided in FULL (see Footnote 6).



























Figure 3: Distribution of participants on the basis of their compliance rates with
the predictions of: A) never imitate worse than own (average rule); B) never imitate
worse than own (max rule); and C) never imitate worse than average.
The predictive value of the max rule and the average rule in “never imitate
worse than own” are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
In order to have a meaningful measure of success for evaluating the
performance of the imitation rules, we need a method that contrasts the
observed compliance rates with those that would obtain if there were no
relation between behavior and imitation. We use the following method. We
randomly simulate the behavior of 100 populations of nine players for 60
periods, and calculate the success of the hypotheses relative to this simu-
lated data. In order to give random behavior the best shot, we take the
experimentally observed frequencies from the experiment as the theoretical
distribution from which random behavior is generated.
The average rates of compliance (and standard deviations) pooling the
data in GROUP, ROLE, and FULL for “never imitate worse than own”
according to the average rule are .739 (.023); for “never imitate worse than
own” according to the max rule they are .739 (.024); and for “never imitate
worse than average” they are .848 (.014). The permutation test shows that
the compliance rates from Table 4 are higher than those randomly obtained
at all standard signiﬁcance levels.
Result 2 On average, behavior of subjects is in line with the predictions of
21when not to imitate in almost 90% of all cases. This result signiﬁ-
cantly outperforms random predictions. At the individual level, a large
majority of subjects shows compliance rates higher than 80%.
4.2.2 When to imitate (according to IBM and IBA)
Before checking particular imitation rules, we ﬁrst ask how often subjects’
behavior can be classiﬁed as imitating in general. Recall that all rules de-
scribed in Section 3 are imitating behavioral rules, i.e. they prescribe to
imitate an action that has been observed in the previous period (abstract-
ing from noise). The ﬁrst line in Table 5 shows the percentages of decisions
that are imitating (regardless of payoﬀ). Since this measure may sometimes
give a misleading impression, we also report in Table 5 compliance rates
weighted with respect to the number of diﬀerent actions a player observes.













t (5 − #O(i,j)t)
, (1)
where #O(i,j)t is the number of diﬀerent actions in player (i,j)’s set of
observed actions at period t,a n dI(i,j)t is a dummy variable that equals 1
if player (i,j) was imitating at period t and 0 otherwise. The weight on an
imitating choice is decreasing in the number of actions a player observed.
(If all ﬁve actions are observed, any choice is imitating; hence there is zero
weight.)
In order to assess the qualitatively similar IBM (“imitate best max”)
and IBA (“imitate best average”) rules, we compute at the individual, pop-
ulation, and treatment level the number of times behavior is in accordance
with the predictions of IBM and IBA, as stated in Deﬁnition 1. Table 5
reports the average absolute rates of compliance, and the average condi-
tional rate of compliance given that imitation was observed, with IBM and
IBA for GROUP, ROLE, and FULL, separately. Note that in GROUP,
IBA and IBM prescribe the same behavior by deﬁnition. For the remaining
treatments the observed average rates of success of IBA and IBM are also
identical up to one decimal point. This is due to the fact that the two rules
22Table 5: Compliance with IBM or IBA
ROLE GROUP FULL
share imitating 58.3% 66.5% 73.1%
weighted comp. 56.5% 65.0% 69.4%
IBM 48.2% 59.3% 55.4%
IBA 48.2% 59.3% 55.4%
IBM given imit 82.5% 88.7% 75.4%
IBA given imit 82.4% 88.7% 75.4%
Note: share imitating gives the percentage of decisions that copy an action observed
in the previous period: weighted comp. reports the percentage of the weighted
compliance rates for imitating behavior. “given imit” counts only cases in which
some action from O(i,j) was chosen.
typically prescribe the same actions (because the strategy with the highest
max is typically also the one with the highest average). Only in less than
2% of all cases they diverge.
The ﬁr s tf a c tt on o t i c ew h e ni n s p e c t i n gT a b l e5i st h a tt h e r ea r em a n y
non—imitating choices (between 27 and 45%). Those may be viewed as
instances of experimentation or as behaviors based on own past payoﬀs.
Thus, it is certainly not appropriate to consider imitation as the exclusive
explanation for observed behavior.
Given this, it is not surprising that the absolute compliance rates for IBM
and IBA shown in lines 3 and 4 of Table 5 are not terribly high although we
will show below that they are signiﬁcantly higher than under random play.
But whenever subjects do imitate, they have a strong tendency to follow
IBA and IBM with compliance rates ranging from 75% to 88%.
In order to compare the data to random behavior using the method
described in the previous subsection, we again simulated 100 populations of
9 players. The average (absolute) rate of compliance thus obtained for IBM
and IBA pooled for GROUP, ROLE, and FULL under random choice is 35%
with a standard deviation of 2.22%. Permutation tests on the basis of the
average rates of compliance for the populations show that both imitation
rules outperform random predictions at any conventional signiﬁcance level.
This further conﬁrms that imitation is present in our data, and that, in














Figure 4: Distribution of individual players on the basis of the observed rates of
agreement with the predictions of IBA and IBM for treatments GROUP, ROLE,
and FULL pooled together.
particular, IBM and IBA play a signiﬁcant role explaining it.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of individual players on the basis of the
observed rates of (absolute) agreement with the predictions of IBA and IBM
for treatments GROUP, ROLE, and FULL pooled together. It is remarkable
that about 10% of the players show a percentage of absolute compliance with
IBM and IBA higher than 80%. This suggests that there is a sizeable number
of almost pure imitators. It is also worth noting that more than 35% of the
participants show a rate of agreement with IBM and IBA higher than 60%.
Result 3 IBM and IBA do about equally well, and both outperform random
predictions signiﬁcantly. Moreover, 10% of subjects are almost pure
imitators whose choices are in line with IBM/IBA in more than 80%
of all decisions.
Our analysis of individual adjustments conﬁrms the insight obtained by
looking at aggregate data. If individuals can imitate actions, most of them
do so. And some do so almost all the time.
Finally, Table 5 shows that the (absolute) degrees of compliance with
IBM and IBA are higher in GROUP than in ROLE. The permutation test
yields signiﬁcance at the .05 level (two-sided).16 This is a surprise ﬁnding
16All other pairwise comparisons are not statistically signiﬁcant.
24that will gain further support below. Intuitively, one might expect that
imitation of others who are in the same role as oneself is more appealing
than imitation of a competitor who, after all, might have a diﬀerent payoﬀ
function. Recall that, at least initially, our subjects do not know that they
are playing a symmetric game. Also, subjects are randomly rematched every
period and can not expect to face the same opponents as last period.
Result 4 Imitation is signiﬁcantly more pronounced when subjects can ob-
serve their immediate competitors (as in treatment GROUP) than
when they can observe others who have the same role in diﬀerent groups
(as in treatment ROLE).
4.3 Estimating imitation rules
The predictions of Schlag’s imitation rules “Proportional Imitation”, DI and
SPOR explicitly refer to the probability o fi m i t a t i n ga na c t i o n .T od oj u s t i c e
to these predictions, we present in this section probit estimates for subjects’
choice functions. In particular, we analyze how subjects’ decisions to change
their action depends on their own payoﬀ and the best payoﬀ they observe.
Furthermore, we also analyze how the likelihood of following IBM depends
on a subject’s own payoﬀ and the best payoﬀ the subject observes.17
Table 6 shows the result of estimating the following probit model with
random eﬀects for all treatments,
Pr(st
i 6= st+1
i )=Φ(α + βπt
i + γπt
imax + vi + εt
i), (2)
where st
i denotes subject i’s strategy in period t, πt
i the subject’s payoﬀ,
πt
imax the maximal payoﬀ the subject observed in his reference group. Φ is
the standard normal distribution, vi the subject-speciﬁcr a n d o me ﬀect, and
εt
i the residual.
In agreement with imitation rules DI and SPOR, the regressions show
that coeﬃcients for own payoﬀsa r es i g n i ﬁcantly negative while those for
17Due to the high correlation of the best max and the best average, results for IBA are
very similar and, therefore omitted.























# of obs. 3186 3186 3186
Note: ∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5%
level.
maximal observed payoﬀsa r es i g n i ﬁcantly positive. This holds for all treat-
ments but it is most pronounced for GROUP.
After analyzing when subjects switch to a diﬀerent action, we shall now
analyze where they switch to if they switch. Table 7 reports subjects’
likelihood of following IBM dependent on their own payoﬀ and the maximal
observed payoﬀ. These regressions are only run for cases in which a subject
actually switched to another action (since the theories allow for inertia, not









imax is the action that had the highest maximal payoﬀ (IBM) in
period t in subject i’s reference group. All other variables are as deﬁned
before. Note, however, that in contrast to regression (2) we now include
πt
imax directly, and also in form of a variable which represents the diﬀerence
between the maximal observed payoﬀ a n dt h eo w np a y o ﬀ.W e c h o s e t h i s
form to be able to test whether only the diﬀerence matters, as predicted e.g.
by Schlag’s Proportional Imitation rule, or whether own payoﬀ and max
payoﬀ enter independently.18 If θ is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
then only the payoﬀ diﬀerence matters.
Table 7 shows that in fact only the payoﬀ diﬀerence matters. In all
three treatments the coeﬃcient of the diﬀerence variable has the expected
18We performed the same test for regression (2) and found that own payoﬀ and max
payoﬀ enter independently.























# of obs. 2079 1644 1920
Note: Only cases with st+1
i 6= st
i included. ∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level,
∗ signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
sign and is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In contrast, the coeﬃcient of the
maximal payoﬀ observed is only (weakly) signiﬁcant in treatment GROUP
and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the other treatments. This is
strong support for all rules that satisfy Property (ii) above, in particular for
Schlag’s Proportional Imitation rule.
Result 5 In line with Schlag’s imitation models, probit estimations show
that the probability with which a subject changes his action decreases
in his own payoﬀ and increases in the maximal observed payoﬀ.F u r -
ther, imitation of the best action becomes increasingly likely when the
diﬀerence between own and maximal observed payoﬀ increases.
4.4 Questionnaire results
While the choice data we collected clearly show that many of our subjects
behave as if they imitate, one cannot be sure whether subjects are aware
of what they are doing and imitate intentionally. Thus, at the end of the
experiment we asked subjects to ﬁll in a computerized questionnaire. Apart
from asking for their major ﬁeld of studies,19 we asked subjects to explain
in a few words how they made their decisions and to answer a multiple
choice question regarding the variables they based their decisions on. In
particular, we asked: “Please sketch in a few words how you arrived at your
19There are no signiﬁcant eﬀects with respect to the ﬁeld of studies.
27Table 8: Multiple choice questions
Number of subjects Treatment
inﬂuenced by... GROUP FULL ROLE
own past payoﬀ(s) 34 32 37
payoﬀs of others in group 39 30 −
payoﬀs of others in role − 19 33
Note: There were 54 subjects per treatment. All subjects chose at least one cate-
gory, but multiple answers were possible.
decisions!”. The multiple choice question asked: “Which of the following was
of particular importance to your decision (multiple answers possible)? a) the
results of your past decisions; b) the average payoﬀ of all participants (only
in FULL); c) the results of the participants who were randomly matched with
you (only in FULL and GROUP); d) the results of the other participants
playing the same role (only in FULL and ROLE).
Table 8 summarizes subjects’ responses to the multiple choice question.
In all treatments own past payoﬀs were of importance to a majority of sub-
jects and in all but treatment GROUP own payoﬀs were the most frequently
named factor. More than 50% of subjects took also payoﬀs of other play-
ers into consideration. Interestingly, we again ﬁnd that subjects are more
interested in imitation when they can observe payoﬀs of their immediate
competitors (compare Result 4 above).
Some of the free—format answers sketching the decision criteria employed
a r ea l s oq u i t ei n s t r u c t i v e .T os u m m a r i z et h e mw eh a v ec l a s s i ﬁed the answers
into 8 main categories which are shown in Table 9 together with selected
typical answers. Some subjects argued exactly as assumed by the various
imitation theories (classiﬁcations “group” and “role”). But other subjects
simply chose at random, tried to diﬀerentiate themselves from the behavior
of others, or followed obscure patterns. There were also subjects who were
clever enough to ﬁnd out the payoﬀ structure of the game (but were often
in despair about their opponents’ play). Finally, some subjects reported to
follow only their own past payoﬀs.
Table 10 lists by treatment the frequency of answers that fall into these
8 categories. Imitation of others in the same group is again a frequently
28Table 9: Classiﬁcation of questionnaire answers
classiﬁcation typical answer
role “Answer with highest payoﬀ of other players in previous round”
group
“When I had the highest payoﬀ, kept the action for the next
round. Otherwise switched to the action that brought
the highest payoﬀ. Sometimes had the impression that
convergent actions of all players yielded lower payoﬀs.”
random “by chance since all attempts of a strategy failed!”
diﬀerentiate
“tried to act anti-cyclically, i.e. not to do what the other
Z-players have done” (in treatment ROLE)
pattern
“tried to ﬁnd out whether an action yielded high payoﬀs
in a particular order – but pattern remained unknown”
“...proceeded according to the scheme: ADBECADBEC...”
clever
“My impression of the rule was that low letters correspond to
low numbers. The sum of payoﬀs seemed to be correlated with
the sum of the letters but those with higher letters got more.
I attempted to reach AAA but my co-players liked to play E...”
own “found out empirically where I got most points on average”
Note: These answers are typical because they are very descriptive of the categories
not because they are typical for all answers in this category.




group 10 12 −
random 9 15 17
diﬀerentiate 2 5 5
pattern − 62
clever 8 2 −
own 13 11 9
Note: A few answers were classiﬁed into two categories.
cited motivation in both, GROUP and FULL, whereas role—imitation is less
prevalent. Random behavior and own—payoﬀ driven behavior is frequent in
all treatments. But there are also types that like to diﬀerentiate themselves,
types that believe in pattern or pattern recognition, and there are some
clever types that guessed the payoﬀ structure correctly.
The key ﬁnding in this section is
Result 7 Subjects not only behave as if they imitate but many imitate inten-
tionally. Other behaviors like random choices, pattern driven behavior,
or behavior determined by own past payoﬀs can also be observed.
5 Conclusion
In contrast to traditional theories of rational behavior, imitation is a be-
havioral rule with very “soft” assumptions on the rationality of agents. Im-
itation is typically modelled by assuming that subjects react to the set of
actions and payoﬀso b s e r v e di nt h el a s tp e r i o d ,b yc h o o s i n ga na c t i o nt h a t
was evaluated as successful.
Recent theoretical results have increased the interest in economics about
imitation. Of particular importance are the results due to Vega—Redondo
(1997) and Schlag (1998). In Cournot games, the former predicts the Wal-
rasian outcome while the latter predicts the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In
principle, these diﬀerences could be due to the diﬀerent adjustment rules the
30models employ and/or the diﬀerent informational conditions they assume.
We study both rules in a generalized theoretical framework and show that
the diﬀerent predictions depend exclusively on the diﬀerent informational
assumptions.
We derive testable predictions for various classes of imitation rules (to
which Vega-Redondo’s and Schlag’s belong) for discrete Cournot games and
test them in an experiment. More speciﬁcally, we study populations of nine
players who are assigned to one of three diﬀerent roles. In each period,
players are randomly matched into three groups to play a simple symmetric
Cournot game, such that always one player from each role is assigned to a
group.
If agents only receive information about others with whom they interact,
all rules that imitate successful actions imply the Walrasian outcome as
the unique stochastically stable state. If agents only receive information
about others who have the same role as they themselves but interact in
other groups, Cournot-Nash play is the unique stochastically stable state.
If agents have both types of information, the set of stochastically stable
states depends on the speciﬁc form of the imitation rule. But, in general,
stochastically stable states range from Cournot to Walrasian outcomes in
such settings.
The experimental results provide clean evidence on both, the aggregate
and individual level, for the relevance of imitation rules. Average outputs
per treatment are exactly, and signiﬁcantly, ordered as suggested by the
generalized imitation model. Alternative learning models that are exclu-
sively based on own past payoﬀs cannot account for this diﬀerence. Similar
support for imitation models is found on the individual level by analyzing
compliance rates for individual adjustments. Additionally, estimations of
individual adjustment rules are in line with the basic principles of all imi-
tation rules. In particular, we ﬁnd support for Schlag’s models that suggest
that the likelihood of imitating another more successful action increases in
the diﬀerence between own and other’s payoﬀ.
Finally, we observe that imitation of actions seems to be more prevalent
when subjects observe others with whom they interact as opposed to others
31who have the same role but play in diﬀerent groups. There is no theoretical
model that would account for such a diﬀerence. Moreover, one might think
that imitation of others who are identical to oneself is more meaningful than
imitation of others with whom we play but who might be diﬀerent. (After
all, subjects in our experiment did not know that they were playing a sym-
metric game.) But this is not supported by the data. One conjecture that
might explain the diﬀerence we observe is that imitation of more success-
ful actions might be particularly appealing when one directly competes with
t h o s ew h oa r em o r es u c c e s s f u l .I no t h e rw o r d s ,t h e r em i g h tb eal i n kb e t w e e n
imitation and the relevance of relative income. In environments where imi-
tation prevents agents to do worse than their immediate competitors, there
is an obvious “evolutionary” beneﬁt from imitating. Thus, evolution might
have primed us towards imitative behavior if we compete with others for the
same resources. This would explain our data but more theoretical work is
needed to study the evolutionary advantages and disadvantages of imitative
behavior.
AP r o o f s
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .First notice that if agents observe only strategies
played in the own group, IBM coincides with IBA. By standard arguments
(see e.g. Samuelson, 1994) only sets of states that are absorbing under the
unperturbed (ε = 0) process can be stochastically stable. A straightforward
generalization of Proposition 1 in Vega—Redondo (1997) shows that only
uniform states can be absorbing (in all other states there is at least one
agent who observes a strategy that fared better than his own), which is why
we can restrict attention in the following to uniform states.20 We will show
that ωe can be reached with one mutation from any other uniform state
ωs 6= ωe. The proof is then completed by showing that it requires at least
two mutations to leave the Walrasian state.
Consider any uniform state ωs 6= ωe and suppose that some player (i,j)t
20Notice that the random rematching of agents into groups is crucial here. If group
compositions were ﬁxed, diﬀerent groups could, of course, use diﬀerent strategies.
32switches to the Walrasian strategy e. As a consequence (i,j)t will have
the highest payoﬀ in group j which will be observed by the other group
members. By property (v) all players who were in group j at time t will
play e in t + 1 with positive probability. Moreover, due to the random
matching it is possible that the three players who were in group j at time
t will be in three distinct groups in t + 1. In that case, each of them will
achieve the highest payoﬀ in their respective group which will be observed
by their group members who then can also switch to the Walrasian strategy
e, such that ωe is reached. (If there are more than three groups, it will
simply take a few periods more to reach ωe.)
It remains to be shown that ωe c a n n o tb el e f tw i t has i n g l em u t a t i o n .
This is straightforward. In fact, it follows from exactly the same argument
as in Vega—Redondo’s result. If a player switches to some strategy s 6= e, he
will have the lowest payoﬀ in his group and will therefore not be imitated.
Moreover, he observes his group members who still play e and earn more
than himself. Thus, he will switch back eventually. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Although with reference groups as in treatment
ROLE, IBM does not always coincide with IBA, we can use identical argu-
ments for both rules to prove the claim. This is due to the fact, that we can
establish the claim by restricting attention to one-shot mutations that do
not induce diﬀerent payoﬀs for any particular strategy an agent observes.
By a similar argument as above, only states, in which all role players
in a given role receive the same payoﬀ, can be candidates for stochastic
stability. We will show that the Cournot state ωc can be reached with a
sequence of one—shot mutations from any other absorbing state. The proof
will be completed by showing that it requires at least two mutations to leave
ωc. It is easy to see that every non—equilibrium state can be left with one
m u t a t i o n .O n eo ft h ep l a y e r sw h oi sc u r r e n t l yn o tb e s tr e p l y i n g ,s a y( i,j),
must simply switch to his best reply. This will increase (i,j)’s payoﬀ which
will also be observed by all other players in role i. Hence, in the next period
all players in role i may have switched to their best replies against their
opponents. Thus, for the ﬁrst claim it remains to be shown that there exists
for any state ω 6= ωc a sequence of (unilateral) best replies that leads into
33ωc. This is easy to see by inspecting the payoﬀ matrix, but follows more
generally from the observation that the game has a potential (see Monderer
and Shapley, 1996).
Now, consider ωc and see what happens when a single player (i,j)
switches to some other strategy. As he moves away from his best reply,
he will earn less than the other agents in the same role i. As he can observe
these other agents, he will not be imitated and will eventually switch back.
Thus, it is impossible to leave ωc with one mutation which completes the
proof.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Note again that only uniform states can be
candidates for stochastic stability. We will show that it takes one mutation
to reach the set {ωc,ωd} from any absorbing state not in this set while it
takes two mutations to leave this set. Consider ﬁrst a possible transition
from ωe to ωc. With 1 mutation a transition to the state ω =( cee)(eee)(eee)
is possible. The two e—players in group 1 observe two e—players (including
themselves) that earn 400 and two others that earn 0, which is on average
200. But they also observe one c—player who gets 300. Thus, with positive
probability in the next round all players in group 1 play c and one round
later everyone plays c. We denote this possible transition in short as:
ωe 1 → (cee)(eee)(eee) → (ccc)(eee)(eee) → ωc,
where the number above the arrow denotes the required number of muta-
tions.
It is easy to see that the following transitions from x = a,b to y = c,d
require one mutation only,
ωx 1 → (yxx)(xxx)(xxx) → (yxx)(yxx)(yxx) → ωy
as well as the transition from ωe to ωd,
ωe 1 → (dee)(eee)(eee) → (ddd)(eee)(eee) → ωd.
Any transition from a state ωy, y = c,d to some states ωx,x6= y,i s
impossible with one mutation as the process must return to ωy
ωy 1 → (xyy)(yyy)(yyy) → ωy.
34Transitions from {ωc,ωd} to ωe require 2 mutations:
ωc 2 → (ccc)(ccc)(aec) → (cec)(cec)(aec) → ωe
ωd 2 → (ddd)(ddd)(ead) → (edd)(edd)(eae) → ωe.
Transitions inside the set {ωc,ωd} also require 2 mutations in both direc-
tions,
ωd 2 → (ccd)(ddd)(ddd) → (ccc)(ddd)(ddd) → ωc
ωc 2 → (ccc)(ccc)(adc) → (cdc)(cdc)(adc) → ωd.
Thus, {ωc,ωd} is the set of stochastically stable states.¥
Proof of Proposition 4. Again notice ﬁr s tt h a ti nt r e a t m e n tF U L La
state is absorbing if and only if it is uniform. (Otherwise there are still some
actions that will eventually be imitated.) We will ﬁr s ts h o wt h a tw ec a n
construct sequences of one-shot mutations that lead from any of the two
“collusive” uniform states (where everybody plays a or everybody plays b)
into one of the others (which we claim to be stochastically stable). Then
we will show that it requires three simultaneous mutations to leave the
more competitive states (where everybody plays c,e v e r y b o d yp l a y sd,o r
everybody plays e).
The ﬁrst step is easy. Consider one of the two collusive states and sup-
pose that one agent, say (i,j)s w i t c h e sa tt i m et to either c,d, or e.C l e a r l y ,
this agent will have the highest overall payoﬀ and can be imitated by every-
body in R(i,j). Now suppose that in t+1 agent (i,j)w i l lo n l yb ei m i t a t e d
by agents who are also in role i but not by those in his group (due to inertia).
Then each group in t + 1 will have one player with a competitive strategy
and two with collusive strategies (regardless of the matching). The highest
payoﬀs are, of course, obtained by those who now play the more competitive
strategy and everybody can observe at least one of these agents. Hence, in
t + 2 everybody will play the competitive strategy.
Next we show that it is not possible to leave one of the competitive
states with a single mutation. Take, for example, the Walrasian state, ωe,
and suppose that one agent (i,j)s w i t c h e sa ts o m et i m et to some strategy
35other than e. This will have two consequences: (i,j)w i l le a r nl e s st h a n
the other agents in group j but more than the other agents in role i.N o w
suppose that the other agents in role i imitate (i,j)i nt + 1, but that (i,j)
himself, does not immediately switch back to e (due to inertia). Then in t+1
all players in role i will play the same strategy other than e while everybody
else will still play e. Clearly, the latter earn more than the former such that
now everybody can revert to playing e.
The same argument applies to states where everybody plays d or ev-
erybody plays c. Moreover, a similar argument applies for the case of two
simultaneous mutations. (Again inertia can be used to compose identical
strategy proﬁles in all groups after the mutations and the ﬁrst round of
imitation.) The proof is completed by the observation that any uniform
state can be reached from any other uniform state by exactly three simul-
taneous mutations. For movements from less to more competitive states we
can make such a transition if all players who have the same role i simulta-
neously switch to higher quantities. For reverse movements from more to
less competitive states we can construct the transition if all players in the
same group j simultaneously switch to lower quantities.21 This completes
the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .
(a) Only uniform states can be imitation equilibria, otherwise there
would be an imitation opportunity. To see that ωe is an imitation equilib-
rium note that if (i,j) deviates from ωe will experience lower payoﬀst h a n
any other player; nobody follows and (i,j) returns to e. To see that any
other uniform state is not an imitation equilibrium consider the deviation
of (i,j) to the immediate higher production level. This creates an imitation
opportunity to players in group j. By random matching this deviation may
spread out the whole population, in which case a destination is reached.
At the destination the payoﬀso f( i,j) are lower than at the original distri-
bution. Player (i,j) returns to the original action. Now players in group j
21Hence, a generalization of our statement for arbitrary numbers of groups and arbitrary
group sizes is not possible. The set of stochastically stable states will, in general, depend
on whether there are more roles or more groups.
36have higher payoﬀst h a n( i,j), do not imitate him, and (i,j) has an imitation
opportunity to go back to the deviation strategy.
(b) If (i,j)d e v i a t e sf r o mωc, he will get lower payoﬀs than players in role
i. Nobody follows the deviation, and (i,j) returns to c. This shows that ωc
is an imitation equilibrium. It is easy to show that any state other than ωc
where members of the same role play the same action, but where diﬀerences
between roles are not excluded, is not an imitation equilibrium. Note then
that there is a (i,j) that is not best-replying, then a deviation of (i,j)t o
his best-reply gives to him higher payoﬀs, creating an imitation opportunity
to players in role i. At this destination (i,j) has higher payoﬀs than at the
original state, and hence does not return to the original action. It remains to
be shown that a state where at least one role whose members play diﬀerent
actions is not an imitation equilibrium. If in such a case, in any random
matching any player has an imitation opportunity, then the assertion holds.
Assume the opposite, then since there are not two diﬀerent best-replies that
give the same payoﬀs, at least one player is not best-replying, and hence the
above argument shows that such a state is not an imitation equilibrium.
(c) To show in FULL that non-uniform states are not imitation equilibria
is tedious, and hence we concentrate on uniform states. We ﬁrst show that
ωc is an imitation equilibrium. At ωc let (i,j) deviate to s
j
i 6= c.T h e n
players in role i will have higher payoﬀst h a n( i,j) and players in group j
will observe that those players in their respective role have higher payoﬀs
than (i,j). Hence, nobody follows. Then, (i,j) observes that c gives higher
payoﬀs to players in role i and hence returns to c.
N o ww es h o wt h a tωe is an imitation equilibrium. At ωe let (i,j)d e v i a t e
to s
j
i 6= e.I nt +1p l a y e r si nr o l ei will follow since will have lower payoﬀs
than (i,j) and will observe that their respective group players also have
lower payoﬀst h a n( i,j), but players in group j will not follow since will
have higher payoﬀst h a n( i,j). In t + 2 all players in role i including (i,j)
will imitate their respective group players and hence ωe is reached.
We now show that ωd is an imitation equilibrium. If at ωd (i,j) deviates
to s
j
i ∈ {a,b,c}, then a deviation path that returns to ωd, analogous to
the one analyzed for the case of ωe, is generated . If at ωd,( i,j) deviates
37to s
j
i = e, then a deviation path that returns to ωd, analogous to the one
analyzed for the case of ωc, is generated.
To show that ωa and ωb are not imitation equilibria it is enough to
show that there exists a sequence of random matchings that makes that the
imitation paths do not return to the original state. Let x = a,b and y = b
if x = a and y = c if x = b. Then, one can check that the following path
can be generated: ωx → (yxx)(xxx)(xxx) → (yyx)(yxy)(yxx) → ωy →
(xyy)(yyy)(yyy) → ωy. ¥
B Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. Do
not talk with the person sitting next to you and remain quiet during the
entire experiment. If you have any questions please ask us. We will come to
you.
During this experiment, which takes 60 rounds, you will be able to earn
points in every round. The number of points you are able to earn depends
on your actions and the actions of the other participants. The rules are very
easy. At the end of the experiment the points will be converted to Euros at
a rate of 3000:1.
Always 9 of the present participants will be evenly divided into three
roles. There are the roles X,Y,Z, taken in always by 3 participants. The
computer randomly allocates the roles at the beginning of the experiment.
You will keep your role for the course of the entire experiment.
In every round every X-participant will be randomly matched by the
computer with one Y -a n do n eZ-participant. After this, you will have to
choose one of ﬁve diﬀerent actions, actions A,B,C,D, and E.W ea r en o t
g o i n gt ot e l ly o u ,h o wy o u rp a y o ﬀ is calculated, but in every round your
payoﬀ depends uniquely on your own decision and the decision of the two
participants you are matched with. The rule underlying the calculation of
the payoﬀ is the same in all 60 rounds.
After every round you get to know how many points you earned with
your action and your cumulative points.
38In addition, you will receive the following information:
You get to know which actions the other two participants who have the
same role as you (and who were matched with diﬀerent participants) have
chosen, and how many points each of them earned.
You get to know which actions the other two participants you were
matched with have chosen, and how many points each of them earned.
Furthermore you get to know how many points all 9 participants (in all
the 3 roles) on average earned in this round.
Those are all the rules. Should you have any questions, please ask now.
Otherwise have fun in the next 60 rounds.
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